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WORDS, DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS IN DISCOURSES OF 
MATHEMATICS, TEACHING AND LEARNING 
Candia Morgan, Institute of Education, University of London 
 
PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS 
The book Mathematical Vocabulary (DfES, 2000) represents the current official discourse of 
school mathematics in England, embodying the values, world view and practices that teachers 
are expected to adopt in their classrooms. The importance of language for children‟s learning 
is stated as the most important motivation for the publication and is presented as a simple and 
unquestionable fact. Thus: 
mathematical language is crucial to children‟s development of thinking. If children 
don‟t have the vocabulary to talk about division, or perimeters, or numerical difference, 
they cannot make progress in understanding these areas of mathematical knowledge. 
(p.1) 
However, the only specific aspect of language identified is “vocabulary” – in fact, 
mathematical language appears to be identified with its vocabulary. The title of the book, its 
format (mainly consisting of lists of words) and the repeated emphasis on vocabulary, 
terminology and words (see the extract in Appendix 1 of the introductory article) construct an 
image of mathematical language as a collection of discrete terms. Although there are 
suggestions of language activities such as discussing, hypothesising, reading or writing 
instructions that hint at the complex functions of language in mathematics, these are presented 
only as “opportunities to develop [children‟s] mathematical vocabulary” (p.3) rather than as 
development of a more broadly conceptualised mathematical language.  
 
In contrast to other kinds of language (described as informal), mathematical words are 
described as technical and correct. Teachers are exhorted to “explain their meanings” and to 
“sort out ambiguities or misconceptions” (p.2). The use of a mathematical dictionary is 
described as necessary in every classroom to be used by both children and teacher “to look up 
the meanings of words” (p.36). The relationship between word and meaning is thus 
constructed as one-to-one and as expressible in terms of other already known words. The 
meaning of the mathematical term appears to be identified with its dictionary definition and 
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understanding of mathematical concepts is implicitly equated to understanding the words with 
which they are expressed. 
 
The mathematical term under consideration in the classroom transcript (Appendix 2 of the 
introductory article) is two-dimensional shape. As advised by the NNS, I turned to a 
mathematical dictionary (Selkirk, 1990) and found three definitions for dimension, the one 
most relevant to this context being: 
the number of measures needed to give the place of any point in a given space, the 
number of coordinates needed to define a point in it. (p.170) 
It seems unlikely that such a formal definition is accessible to Y5 children or very useful to 
their teacher. Moreover, even this definition is not entirely unambiguous, as the nature of the 
“given space” is left open. For example, the question of whether a circle is one-dimensional 
or two-dimensional (see turns 24-34) is not immediately resolvable.
i
 This is not a weakness in 
the definition but a characteristic of the mathematical concept itself.  
 
Most importantly, I question whether any definition can capture the richness of the 
mathematical thinking about dimensions that the children and teacher were engaged in during 
the lesson. Rather than producing an unambiguous meaning for this term, the talk of the 
children and the teacher constructs a multi-faceted notion of dimension. This includes: 
 the idea of 2D as “flat” and 3D as “solid” (turns 7, 9); 
 listing dimensions (breadth, height, etc.) invoking an implicit two-ness or three-ness (turns 
6, 32); 
 a notion of 3D involving something extra when compared to 2D (turn 9); 
 the idea  that “thickness” is characteristic of 3D (turn 41); 
 diagrammatic representations of 2D (a square) and 3D (a 2D isometric drawing of a cube) 
(turn 9); 
 imagining what might be meant by one- and even zero-dimensional objects (turns 14-19). 
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All of these aspects of the meanings of two-dimensional and three-dimensional seemed 
relevant, valid, and at some points, especially during the discussion of one- and zero-
dimensions, mathematically sophisticated, though often incomplete or ambiguous (as in the 
listing of circumference, diameter and radius in identifying the dimensionality of a circle at 
turn 32). Yet at no point during the lesson did it seem possible or even appropriate to explain 
or to remove all ambiguities from the ways in which the words were being used or to establish 
a single „correct‟ way of speaking and thinking about dimensionality. 
 
An important aspect of the classroom dialogue in the extract is the implicit nature of the 
definition. An explicit definition of two-dimensional shape is never given, instead: 
 some properties are named (flatness, width and length) – and properties a two-dimensional 
shape should not have (breadth, thickness); 
 some examples (square) and non-examples (cube, line) are given; 
 contrasts are constructed between two-dimensional shapes and shapes with other numbers 
of dimensions (e.g. turns 9, 41). 
 
This perceived tension between the official discourse of the current mathematics curriculum 
and that of mathematical practice in a primary classroom prompted me to look more widely at 
the ways in which word-concept relationships are constructed in different mathematical 
practices. In what follows, I first review the role of definitions in mathematics itself, as 
discussed by mathematicians and mathematics educators. This is followed by an exploratory 
analysis of a small number of examples of definitions taken from published mathematics 
research papers and from school textbooks. The similarities and differences between these 
raise questions about relationships between school mathematics and the mathematics done by 
professional mathematicians (in universities and in industry) and about how the ways in 
which definitions are presented in school may affect students‟ access to higher mathematics. 
 
THE ACADEMIC VIEW OF DEFINITION IN MATHEMATICS 
The notion of definition has a privileged place in many mathematical practices, highlighted by 
the claim by mathematicians and mathematics educators that mathematical definitions are 
different from „ordinary‟ definitions, as well as by its frequent association with terms such as 
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unambiguous, minimal or necessary and sufficient that are highly valued in high status 
mathematical discourses.  
 
Borasi, a mathematics educator who has undertaken research both at school level and with 
university mathematicians, lists the following “commonly accepted requirements for 
mathematical definitions”: 
Precision in terminology. All the terms employed in the definition should have been 
previously defined, unless they are one of the few undefined terms assumed as a starting 
point in the axiomatic system one is working with.
 ii
 
Isolation of the concept. All instances of the concept must meet all the requirements 
stated in its definition, while a non-instance will not satisfy at least one of them. 
Essentiality. Only terms and properties that are strictly necessary to distinguish the 
concept in question from others should be explicitly mentioned in the definition. 
Non-contradiction. All the properties stated in the definition should be able to coexist. 
Non-circularity. The definition should not use the term it is trying to define. 
(Borasi, 1992, pp.17-18) 
In commenting on these requirements, she makes use of two criteria for justifying them. A 
definition of a given mathematical concept should: 
1. Allow us to discriminate between instances and non-instances of the concept with 
certainty, consistency, and efficiency (by simply checking whether a potential candidate 
satisfies all the properties stated in the definition). 
and should: 
2. “Capture” and synthesise the mathematical essence of the concept (all the properties 
belonging to the concept should be logically derivable from those included in its 
definition). 
 
The requirements listed do not seem peculiar to mathematics (apart perhaps from the formal 
acknowledgement of the role of undefined terms), though they may be applied rather more 
rigorously than in other domains. Borasi‟s criteria, however, hint at a role for definitions 
within mathematical practice that goes beyond both the record of usage of standard 
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dictionaries and the technical taxonomising of common-sense phenomena identified by 
Wignell (1998) in the practices of natural and social sciences. Definitions in mathematics 
form a basis for logical derivation not only of those properties already known (perhaps in a 
common-sense way) to belong to the concept but also of new properties. 
 
The notion that mathematics may be generated from definitions by logical deduction is 
strongly embedded in traditional methods of teaching mathematics at the university. Often 
characterised as definition, theorem, proof
iii
, much exposition of mathematics to 
undergraduates has taken the form of the presentation of logical sequences of deduction from 
definitions, though this approach to teaching has been widely criticised by mathematics 
educators and by students themselves for its failure to help students to develop the concepts 
involved or, indeed, to learn how to derive proofs themselves (see, for example, Anderson et 
al., 2000; Burn, 2002). The definition, theorem, proof format is also strongly represented in 
published mathematics research reports. As Burn points out, however, this may not always 
represent the way that research mathematicians actually go about doing mathematics. 
The research mathematician may come to his results starting from special cases, which 
will appear as corollaries in the final version, from which he gets his ideas, which is 
worked with until he has a proof. Then the theorem is what has been proved. At this 
point he formulates his definitions so as to make the theorem and proof as neat as 
possible. (Burn, 2002, p.30) 
During the early stages, the concepts the mathematician works with may thus not be formally 
defined but more or less intuitive, derived from special cases – concept images rather than 
concept definitions, to use Tall & Vinner‟s (1981) distinction.iv The construction of the formal 
definition and the consequent creation of a technical term is a deliberate creative act, aiming 
not simply to describe or “capture” a pre-existing concept but to shape that concept in a way 
that lends itself to particular purposes. Of course, this definition may subsequently be used to 
generate deductive sequences leading to the discovery of further theorems. 
A further characteristic of mathematical definitions is the possibility of multiple „equivalent‟ 
definitions. I have used scare quotes for the term equivalent because, while two definitions 
may identify the same object, it is questionable whether they necessarily correspond to the 
same concept and they certainly lead to different forms of mathematical activity. Borasi gives 
the example of alternative definitions of a circle: the metric definition (focusing on the idea 
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that all points on a circle are equidistant from a given centre), generally used at early stages of 
school mathematics, and the analytic definition (expressed in the form of an equation such as 
  
x a
2
x b
2
r
2
), encountered by students at Advanced level. Either definition can be 
used to solve a problem such as “Find the circle passing through three given points” but the 
choice of definition makes a significant difference to the process of solution (Borasi, 1992, 
p.19). 
 
Characteristics of the use of definitions in mathematics thus include: 
 There exists a possibility of conflict with intuitive images of the concept being defined, 
especially with images formed by generalising from examples. 
 Definitions form a generative basis for logical deduction, not only of known properties of 
the concept but of new properties. 
 Definitions may be created deliberately in particular forms in order to facilitate the 
construction of theorems and proofs. 
 A single object may be defined in several logically but not conceptually equivalent ways 
and such alternative definitions facilitate the generation of different types of theorems, 
proofs and solution methods. 
These characteristics contribute to a relationship between definition and concept that appears 
dynamic and open to manipulation and decision making by mathematicians. This contrasts 
sharply with the static word-concept relationship constructed by the NNS advice. 
 
ANALYSIS OF DEFINITIONS IN MATHEMATICAL TEXTS 
In this section, I shall examine, compare and contrast the roles that definitions play in 
different mathematical practices applying a critical discourse analytic approach (Fairclough, 
1992) to a small number of written texts. This analysis allows us to identify epistemological 
differences between discourses, variations in the ways in which the activity of the human 
mathematician is represented in relation to definitions, and tensions between the various 
discursive resources that teachers and students may draw on as new mathematical language is 
introduced. The texts come from three sources: an article published in an academic research 
journal and two school textbooks aimed at slightly different populations of students. By 
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focusing on written texts, I am looking at only one aspect of the practices in which the texts 
arose. I would argue, however, that because of the high status of written language and the 
extent of writing activities in those practices, the analyses will have high relevance. Research 
papers are often taken to represent the official discourse of mathematics because of their 
important role in regulating the academic mathematics community, although there is also 
variation among them (Burton & Morgan, 2000) and of course there are other forms of 
academic mathematics practice that involve very different kinds of texts. My intention is to 
compare and contrast the place of definitions and the way in which relationships between 
word, definition and concept are constructed in this official discourse of mathematics with 
their place in school mathematics practices and to consider the extent to which the texts that 
inform school students‟ experience of mathematics serve to apprentice them to academic 
mathematics practices. 
 
Rather than examining further texts related to primary mathematics, I have chosen textbooks 
designed for students in Key Stage 4 (aged 15-16). These represent the endpoint of 
mathematics education for many students and a transition to more advanced and specialist 
study for others. They may thus be seen to represent an eventual target towards which the 
Year 5 pupils in the classroom transcript and other primary pupils whose mathematical 
experience is shaped by the NNS are aiming. This provides a basis for considering the ways 
in which the approach to mathematical language recommended by the NNS provides an 
adequate and meaningful preparation for participation in more advanced mathematical 
practices. 
 
The analysis uses tools drawn from systemic functional grammar (Halliday, 1985) selected to 
illuminate the ways in which the nature of mathematics and mathematical activity may be 
constructed through the texts presented to students. These are outlined in Table 1, identifying 
the questions used to interrogate a text and the grammatical tools that operationalise the 
resulting description. The first two questions in the table are related to Halliday‟s (1973) 
ideational function of language, concerned with the nature of our experience of the world, the 
next two to the interpersonal function, concerned with the identities of the participants and 
relationships between them, and the final question to the textual function, concerned with the 
way the text itself becomes a “living message”. The description thus constructed allows us to 
address critical questions about how the text may contribute to possible readers‟ positioning 
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in relation to mathematics and mathematical activity, asking in particular: What is the nature 
of mathematics/ mathematical objects/ mathematical activity? (using the first two questions in 
Table 1) and Where do power and authority lie? (using the second two questions) as well as 
specifically considering the role of definitions in the text and, by extension, in the practice. In 
the cases that follow, I do not present full grammatical descriptions but use the questions and 
tools outlined in Table 1 to highlight selected aspects that contribute significantly to 
addressing these critical questions and allow us to see most clearly the differences between 
the various texts. A fuller discussion of applications of this approach in mathematics 
education research may be found in (Morgan, 1996, 1998). 
 
 Table 1: Analytic Tools. 
Descriptive questions: Grammatical tools: 
Who or what are the actors and where does 
agency lie? 
What objects and humans are present? How 
are active or passive voice used? 
What are the processes? Relational, material, mental/behavioural? 
What are the roles of the author and reader 
and what is the relationship between them? 
How are personal pronouns used? In what 
kinds of processes are author and reader 
actors? 
Describe the modality. Modal verbs, adverbs, adjectives 
How is the status of „definition‟ established 
textually?  
Given/New structures
v
; how cohesion is 
achieved. 
 
Definitions in a research paper 
In two extracts from the same mathematics research paper
vi
, published in a standard academic 
journal, we can see a break from the orthodox expectation of a one-to-one relationship 
between concept and definition and the construction of definition as a (possibly contestable) 
product of human endeavour. The first extract comes from the introductory section of the 
paper. 
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Extract 1 
In the first section of the paper we give a somewhat non-standard definition of the 
Hecke algebra as a subquotient of the group algebra, which is easily seen to be 
equivalent to the usual definitions. This viewpoint makes the actions of the Hecke 
algebra on cohomology more or less transparent (see Lemma 1.1), as well as being 
adapted for our intended applications (e.g., Lemma 5.1).
vii
 
Extract 2 is taken from a later section of the same paper in which findings and the reasoning 
leading to them is presented using the definition, theorem, proof format discussed above. 
Extract 2 
We recall the definition of a G-functor (Green [6]). … 
Definition. A G-functor F = (F, R, I, C) over k consists of a k-module F(H) 
corresponding to each subgroup H of G and the following operations: […] 
Satisfying the following axioms […] 
Definition. A G-functor is said to be cohomological if it satisfies 
(C) IH
K
RH
K
x K : H x whenever H K,x F K  
An analysis of the two extracts, structured by the questions identified in Table 1 above, is 
presented in Table 2 and is discussed below. 
 
Table 2: Analysis of extracts of a mathematics research paper 
 Extract 1 Extract 2 
Actors & 
Agency 
we give a … definition – human agency 
is explicit at first, though the definition 
then is easily seen – the passive voice 
obscuring agency. 
This viewpoint is presented as an actor in 
its own right, completing a shift from 
active human agency to metaphorical 
agency of the definition itself. 
Human agency is present in the first 
sentence, recalling the definition, but is 
obscured by use of the passive voice is 
said to be in the second definition. 
The citation of the mathematician Green 
may be considered to ascribe agency to 
him as originator of the definition. 
Processes Mental process see would normally Mental process we recall. 
  10 
 
require a sentient agent but here is in the 
passive voice.  
Material process make transparent is 
performed by the abstract viewpoint.  
Behavioural process is said, here in the 
passive voice. 
Relational A G-functor … consists of [a 
collection of its parts] 
Author & 
Reader 
The (single) author uses we in a way that 
cannot include his reader as it refers to 
his act of writing the definition. This is a 
widely, though not universally, observed 
convention in mathematics research 
papers (see Burton & Morgan, 2000). 
The statement that the definition is 
adapted for our intended applications 
establishes the author‟s ownership of the 
material presented in the paper. 
We recall in this case may be read as an 
inclusive use of we orienting the reader 
to knowledge that is available to them as 
members of the academic community. 
Modality The suggestion that the definition is 
easily seen to be equivalent may serve to 
assert authority over the reader. If an 
individual reader cannot see, it must 
arise from their own inadequacy. 
Modifications somewhat non-standard 
and more or less, on the other hand, 
reduce the strength of the claims in this 
section. 
The modality throughout is absolute. At 
this point in the paper, definitions are not 
open to question. 
Textual 
status of 
definition 
As might be expected in an introductory 
paragraph, the thematic structure of the 
first sentence orients the reader to the 
organisation of the paper. Subsequently, 
the viewpoint or definition is itself 
positioned thematically. 
In the first definition, the word G-
functor is given and the description of its 
properties is the new information, 
providing the properties that distinguish 
this concept from others. In the second, 
this order is reversed. A given object is 
said to be cohomological – a pre-
existing concept is given a new name, 
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although the order here is not consistent 
as the properties that allow the new 
name to be used are listed afterwards. 
Bold headings mark definitions as 
important. These and the label (C) will 
be referred back to in the proofs that 
follow later in the paper. 
 
The claims of the paper depend on the idea, made explicit in Extract 1, that the same object 
(the Hecke algebra) can be defined in alternative ways. The modification somewhat non-
standard implies that definitions are not unique but at the same time that there exist privileged 
definitions that are generally acknowledged/valued by the community. A standard definition 
is likely to be known (or at least readily accessible) to the expected reader of this paper. The 
modality of somewhat defers apologetically to the community values but this is tempered by 
the strong authority claim that the new definition can easily be seen to be equivalent. In this 
paragraph, therefore, the author is establishing his identity within the community, 
acknowledging the priority of established knowledge while claiming novelty, validity and 
utility for his own work. 
 
The metaphor of alternative definition as a “viewpoint” is consistent with the discussion of 
multiple equivalent definitions above. A definition is not identical with the object but is a way 
of looking at an independently existing object. The choice of a particular definition is 
presented both in relation to general community values (transparency) and as a personal or 
contextual matter, related to “our intended applications”. It is thus possible to make 
judgements about the value of definitions based not only on the global, structural criteria 
identified by Borasi but also on more local criteria related to the problem currently under 
consideration, in a way similar to that described by Burn (2002). 
 
In Extract 2, the possibility of alternatives is not considered, though the citation ascribes 
ownership of the first definition, suggesting that the definition may not be commonly known 
but was an original product of the cited mathematician. The structure of the definition itself as 
an absolute statement of the constituent parts of the G-functor and of its necessary properties 
  12 
 
gives no hint of its origin. Did this object pre-exist its definition in some common-sense way 
or was it entirely a product of Green‟s imagination? Thus it is not clear whether this definition 
is an invention or a discovery; it is simply a statement of properties. The second definition, on 
the other hand, is presented as a human construction – or at least a human decision about how 
to name the kind of object described. Whatever the origin of the definitions, their structural 
importance in the mathematical arguments constructed in the paper is marked by the use of 
bold headings and labels. 
 
The presentation of definitions in this research paper thus include features similar to those 
identified in the previous section: 
 there can be different definitions of the same object; 
 choices between definitions may be made on the basis of utility; 
 definitions play an important role in the formation of mathematical argument. 
 they are the product of human activity, though it is not always clear whether this is the 
construction of new objects or naming of pre-existing objects; 
In addition, it appears that various definitions of the same object have different standings 
within the mathematical community and may need more or less justification by an author. 
 
Definitions in school mathematics texts 
The ways in which definitions appear in school mathematics texts vary significantly with the 
type of mathematics involved and with the age of the intended student-readers. At lower 
levels, in spite of the NNS advice, most new terms seem to be introduced by naming and by 
exemplification rather than by explanation or definition. Given the limited space available in 
this paper, it is not possible to review the different approaches in detail, so I have chosen to 
focus on two examples from Key Stage 4 (Years 10 and 11), the stage at which students are 
expected increasingly to engage in formal mathematical reasoning, including the use of 
definitions (DfEE, 1999). The two examples chosen as a starting point are taken from 
textbooks in the same series, written by the same authors, intended for students in Key Stage 
4 preparing for GCSE examinations at Intermediate and at Higher level (public examinations 
taken at age 16+ at the end of compulsory education, set at different levels for students with 
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different expected levels of attainment). Both examples present definitions of trigonometric 
concepts, though at different levels.
viii
 
 
GCSE Intermediate Textbook 
In Investigation 15:1, you found that the ratio 
  
shortest side
longest side
 i.e. 
  
opposite
hypotenuse
 is the same for each 
of these triangles. 
This ratio is given a special name. It is called the sine of 40° or sine 40°. 
The ratio 
  
adj acent
hypotenuse
 is called cosine 40°. The ratio 
  
opposite
adj acent
 is called tangent 40°. 
The abbreviations sin, cos, tan are used for sine, cosine, tangent. 
The ratios sin A, cos A, tan A are called trigonometrical ratios, or trig. ratios. 
 
GCSE Higher Textbook 
The ratios sin  and cos  may be defined in relation to the lengths of the sides of a right-
angled triangle. 
sin  is defined as 
  
length of opposite side
length of hypotenuse
. 
cos  is defined as 
  
length of adj acent side
length of hypotenuse
. 
Since  < 90, sin  and cos  defined in this way only have meaning for angles less than 
90°. 
We will now look at an alternative definition for sin  and cos  which has meaning for 
angles of any size. (…) This gives the following alternative definition for the ratios cos  
and sin . 
The ratios cos  and sin  may be defined as the coordinates of a point P where OP 
makes an angle of  with the positive x-axis and is of length 1. Defined in this way, the 
ratios cos  and sin  have meaning for angles of any size. 
 
An analysis is given in Table 3, laid out to facilitate comparison of the two texts. 
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Table 3: Analysis of GCSE Texts 
 GCSE Intermediate GCSE Higher 
Actors & 
Agency 
The ratio is given a special name, is 
called and the abbreviations … are used 
– passive voice obscures agency 
The ratios … may be defined – passive 
voice 
Sin and cos have meaning 
Processes Material process found by student 
Behavioural processes call, use which 
would normally require a sentient agent 
but here are in the passive voice 
Behavioural processes define and look 
Relational (intensive) have [meaning] 
Author & 
Reader 
You found … – student agent in practical 
activity 
We will look – is this the authors or is it 
an inclusive we? In either case, there is 
some human agency here and it is 
possible to read this as an expression of 
solidarity. 
Modality Generally neutral i.e. absolute modality 
(these are given facts – no questions 
asked) 
The ratio is given a special name – 
stressing the importance of the new 
vocabulary 
Modification of verbs to reduce level of 
certainty – may be defined. This opens 
up the possibility of alternative ways of 
doing things - and the possibility that the 
student might be able to make choices. 
Similar adverbial and adjectival 
modifications: defined in this way, an 
alternative definition 
Textual 
status of 
definition 
All sentences except the first have 
unmarked word order: the ratio (found 
by the student) is the given knowledge; 
the mathematical terminology is the 
new. 
Move from a specific example of a 
concrete object (the ratio of opposite to 
hypotenuse in a 40° triangle) to giving a 
In the final sentence, word order is 
marked by positioning the adverbial 
phrase defined in this way in the „given 
knowledge‟ position. The form of the 
definition is presented as changing the 
meaning of the object – thus definition 
precedes object/concept 
Since  < 90 in a thematic position 
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name to this object and to extending this 
naming to general similar objects – thus 
the object/concept pre-exists the naming 
of it  
Cohesion achieved by repetition of the 
ratio and its cognates in the thematic 
position, presenting the text as a 
collection of facts about the ratio – 
description. 
presents the text as a process of logical 
argument. 
 
Some significant differences between the two texts are apparent from this analysis. 
Considering the nature of mathematics and mathematical activity in the context of definition, 
in both texts agency in the act of naming or defining is obscured by use of the passive voice 
but the types of activity in which human actors are agents are different. In the Intermediate 
text, the student herself is presented as having been involved in an earlier practical activity. In 
the Higher text, there is no practical activity but we are engaged in the intellectual activity of 
looking at an alternative definition. The forms of the two texts themselves also contribute to 
differences in the type of activity that is constructed as mathematical. The Intermediate text is 
essentially descriptive, starting with what is known about a specific concrete example and 
extending the description to naming a more general set of similar objects. The object/concept 
of the ratio between two sides of a triangle is established as the outcome of practical activity 
before it is named. This order is reversed in the Higher text: the choice of an alternative 
definition changes the nature of the object being defined. This text also uses structures that 
highlight the formation of a logical argument – an aspect of mathematical activity absent from 
the Intermediate extract. 
 
The second major difference arises from the modality of the two texts. While the Intermediate 
text lays down a set of absolute and unquestionable facts to be accepted by the student-reader, 
the Higher text allows uncertainty and alternatives, opening up the possibility that the student-
reader herself might choose between the two definitions. The student entered for the Higher 
level examination is thus constructed as a potential initiate into the practices of creative and 
purposeful definition that academic mathematicians engage in.  
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DISCUSSION 
The examples analysed here were not selected in a systematic way so it would be 
inappropriate to draw firm conclusions about differences between various types of texts. The 
analysis does, however, raise some questions and hypotheses about the ways that definitions 
are presented at different levels and the roles that they play in different mathematical 
practices. The extracts from the research paper confirm the characteristics of mathematical 
definition identified in the literature on advanced mathematical thinking, in particular their 
role in argument and the possibility of purposeful choice between alternative definitions of 
the same object. These characteristics may also be seen in the extract from the textbook for 
Higher level students. The definitions encountered by the Intermediate level students involve 
naming and formalising a pre-existing concept, playing a role much closer to that 
characteristic of definitions in natural and social sciences (Wignell, 1998). Similar differential 
access to mathematical practices is identified by Dowling (1998) in his analysis of a 
differentiated textbook scheme. In that case, the „lower‟ students were constructed as engaged 
in „everyday‟ practices and were denied access to esoteric mathematical practices. 
 
The NNS characterisation of the relationship between mathematical vocabulary, meaning and 
understanding contains no hint of the logical, generative or creative aspects of mathematical 
definition. Of course, it is necessary to consider whether this reflects essential differences 
between different types of mathematical concept met at different stages of learning 
mathematics. Perhaps only the concepts encountered at more advanced levels lend themselves 
to these forms of mathematical activity? A counter-example to this suggestion, familiar to 
many teachers of mathematics at both primary and secondary levels, is the concept of 
rectangle and the debate that arises in classrooms about whether a square is a rectangle 
(resulting, perhaps, from trying to find the rectangle with the largest area for a given 
perimeter). Resolving this debate involves making a choice about the precise definition of 
rectangle to be used and then engaging in logical argument based on the chosen definition. It 
also seems to involve the sort of conflict between concept image and concept definition 
identified by researchers in advanced mathematical thinking (e.g., Tall & Vinner, 1981). 
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Returning to the primary classroom transcript, here too we can see younger students involved 
in forms of mathematical practice that go beyond those suggested by the NNS booklet. While 
no formal definition of dimension is given in the lesson, the discussion towards the end of the 
transcript shows participants using their implicit definitions to form arguments about whether 
particular shapes (and even whole classes of potentially constructible shapes) fulfil the 
necessary conditions to be classified as two-dimensional (turns 41-56). As we have seen, this 
form of reasoning is one of the important ways in which definitions are used in mathematics 
and plays a significant role in mathematical reasoning and proof. If formalised, it could match 
the conventional order of presentation of definition, theorem, proof found in academic papers. 
At the same time, the ambiguity and multiplicity of meanings at play in this classroom 
provide a setting for argumentation that seems likely to contribute more to the children‟s 
developing understanding of the concepts involved – and of mathematical activity itself – 
than any “clear explanation” could.  
 
Another interesting – and mathematical – aspect of the transcript is the generative activity. 
Starting from the children‟s conceptions of two and three dimensions, derived at least in part 
from experience with concrete objects, new, increasingly abstract, objects are conceived with 
one dimension and no dimensions. Again, the adaptation and extension of definitions into 
new domains is an important way in which new mathematics is created. These children, like 
those using the Higher level GCSE text, are being inducted into creative mathematical 
practices. The one-to-one word-to-meaning relationship apparent in the NNS official 
discourse thus seems neither to reflect the way in which mathematical words and meanings 
are related in practice nor to provide any inkling of the powerful and productive role that 
definitions can play in mathematics.  
 
The image of vocabulary and concept development presented by the NNS is thus both 
restrictive in the model it presents of language use and inadequate to describe what actually 
happens in classrooms. The differences identified between the treatment of definition of 
trigonometric ratios in Higher and Intermediate textbooks also suggest that opportunities to 
experience some characteristically mathematical aspects of the use of definitions may be 
being restricted for many students. There is a need to look more thoroughly and critically at 
the ways in which concepts and vocabulary are introduced to younger and less advanced 
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students in classroom practice and in texts and curriculum guidance and to consider 
alternatives that may serve to introduce them to powerful forms of mathematical thinking. 
 
Equally the emphasis put on vocabulary by the NNS presents a restricted image of the nature 
of mathematical language itself. The analysis of mathematical texts that I have offered in this 
article, by considering the grammatical construction of mathematical meanings and of 
relationships between the authors and readers mathematical texts, also demonstrates some of 
the ways in which mathematical language consists of more than just specialist vocabulary. 
Learning to engage in mathematical discourse thus involves learning more than definitions of 
mathematical words. Taking definitions as just one example of a type of mathematical text, 
their formation and their incorporation into mathematical arguments are fundamental 
mathematical activities that take place in language. Induction into mathematical practices 
must involve students in developing ways of speaking and writing that enable them to engage 
in these activities. The importance of mathematical language has been recognised by the NNS 
and current teaching practice at both primary and secondary levels in English schools now 
involves considerable effort to incorporate „key words‟ into lesson plans and into the 
classroom environment. While I am not convinced that official endorsement is enough to 
change classroom practice for the better, recognition of the broader nature of mathematical 
language and what may be done with it might create opportunities for teachers and students to 
develop greater awareness of the ways in which they can use language to do mathematics. 
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NOTES 
i
 If the circle is seen as a part of a more substantial space such as a plane then two measures 
will be needed to define a point on it. However, if the circle itself constitutes the entire space, 
only one measure is needed, i.e. the distance from a fixed point on the circle in a positive 
direction around the circumference. 
ii
 In this context, undefined term does not mean a non-scientific or „everyday‟ term. It refers to 
the basic objects of an abstract mathematical system.  
iii
 In this form of presentation, one or more definitions are given, the theorem to be proved is 
stated, then an argument is made showing how the definitions (together with other theorems 
that have already been established in this way) logically imply the theorem. 
iv
 A concept image is a more or less intuitive concept, generally derived from experience of a 
number of examples and from analogies with informal or everyday concepts, visual images 
and language. The corresponding concept definition does not simply describe a concept image 
but may even conflict with it. A typical example of such conflict arises with the concept of the 
limit of a sequence. For many students, their concept image includes the notion that a limit is 
never reached and that subsequent terms of a given sequence will get closer and closer to its 
limit. The concept definition, however, is formulated to include constant sequences, all of 
whose terms are equal to the limit of the sequence. 
v
 Halliday notes that, grammatically, definitions may be set up “facing both ways”, using 
constructions: “a is defined as x” or “x is called a” (1993, p.73). In the first of these 
constructions, the word itself is „given‟ while the description of the concept is presented as 
„new‟; this order is consistent with a creative function of definition. The act of defining brings 
the mathematical concept into being and provides it formally with the properties that 
distinguish it from other concepts. The second construction, by contrast, suggests that the 
concept pre-exists its definition; by being given a technical name, a „common sense‟ or more 
intuitive technical concept is “translated” into specialised knowledge (Martin, 1993, p.209).  
vi
 The details of the sample of mathematics research papers from which this paper is taken are 
given in (Burton & Morgan, 2000). 
vii
 I will not attempt to clarify the meaning of this passage for the non-mathematician reader. It 
may be helpful, however, to recognise that the term algebra as used here does not refer to the 
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kind of manipulation of letters experienced within school mathematics. It refers to an abstract 
structure consisting of elements that may be combined in specified ways. An algebra is thus 
an object rather than a field of activity. 
viii
 The textbook, of course, is not the only source of definition for students. In most 
classrooms, the text is likely to be mediated by the teacher and this will affect the ways in 
which students interact with the text themselves. As students construct their understandings of 
the nature of mathematics and mathematical activity and of their own identities in relation to 
mathematics they will draw to different extents on the textbook, the teacher‟s speech and 
actions and on their previous experiences. However, where teachers are insecure in their own 
subject knowledge they are likely to rely heavily on the forms of definition and argumentation 
that are provided for them in published resources. Haggarty and Pepin (2002) note that in 
England, while students themselves make relatively little use of textbooks, their teachers use 
them extensively in planning lessons. Textbooks thus have a strong influence, whether direct 
or indirect, on students‟ experience of mathematics.  
 
